Imperfect 1-out-of-2 quantum oblivious transfer: bounds, a protocol, and
  its experimental implementation by Amiri, Ryan et al.
Imperfect 1-out-of-2 quantum oblivious transfer: bounds, a protocol, and its
experimental implementation
Ryan Amiri,1 Robert Sta´rek,2 Michal Micˇuda,2 Ladislav Miˇsta, Jr.,2
Miloslav Dusˇek,2 Petros Wallden,3 and Erika Andersson1
1SUPA, Institute of Photonics and Quantum Sciences,
Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh EH14 4AS, United Kingdom
2Department of Optics, Palacky University, Olomouc, Czech Republic
3LFCS, School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh,
10 Crichton Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AB, United Kingdom
Oblivious transfer is an important primitive in modern cryptography. Applications include secure
multiparty computation, oblivious sampling, e-voting, and signatures. Information-theoretically
secure perfect 1-out-of 2 oblivious transfer is impossible to achieve. Imperfect variants, where both
participants’ ability to cheat is still limited, are possible using quantum means while remaining
classically impossible. Precisely what security parameters are attainable remains unknown. We
introduce a theoretical framework for studying semi-random quantum oblivious transfer, which is
shown equivalent to regular oblivious transfer in terms of cheating probabilities. We then use it
to derive bounds on cheating. We also present a protocol with lower cheating probabilities than
previous schemes, together with its optical realisation. We show that a lower bound of 2/3 on the
minimum achievable cheating probability can be directly derived for semi-random protocols using
a different method and definition of cheating than used previously. The lower bound increases
from 2/3 to approximately 0.749 if the states output by the protocol are pure and symmetric. The
oblivious transfer scheme we present uses unambiguous state elimination measurements and can
be implemented with the same technological requirements as standard quantum cryptography. In
particular, it does not require honest participants to prepare or measure entangled states. The
cheating probabilities are 3/4 and approximately 0.729 for sender and receiver respectively, which is
lower than in existing protocols. Using a photonic test-bed, we have implemented the protocol with
honest parties, as well as optimal cheating strategies. Due to the asymmetry of the receiver’s and
sender’s cheating probabilities, the protocol can be combined with a “trivial” protocol to achieve
an overall protocol with lower average cheating probabilities of approximately 0.74 for both sender
and receiver. This demonstrates that interestingly, protocols where the final output states are pure
and symmetric are not optimal in terms of average cheating probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the discovery of quantum key distribution
in 1984 [1], there arose a general optimism that quan-
tum mechanics may provide a means to perform multi-
party computations with information-theoretic security.
Despite this early confidence, the history of secure two-
party computations is characterised by mainly negative
results. Mayers and Lo [2, 3] proved that all one-sided
two-party computations are insecure in the quantum set-
ting, meaning that it is impossible to perform important
protocols such as bit commitment and oblivious transfer
(OT) with information-theoretic security. Nevertheless,
imperfect variants of these protocols remain possible, and
it has been an interesting and productive open question
to determine the optimal security parameters achievable
for some important two-party computations.
For many cryptographic primitives, this question has
been definitively answered. For strong coin flipping, Ki-
taev [4] introduced the semi-definite programming for-
malism to show that the product of Alice’s and Bob’s
cheating probabilities must be greater than 1/2, imply-
ing that the minimum cheating probability is at least
1/
√
2. For weak coin flipping, Mochon [5] showed that
the minimum cheating probability is at least 1/2 +  for
any  > 0. In the same paper a protocol achieving this
bound is presented, showing that the bound is tight.
Chailloux and Kerenidis [6] used these results on weak
coin flipping to generate a protocol for strong coin flip-
ping achieving Kitaev’s bound. Lastly, for quantum bit
commitment, Chailloux and Kerenidis [7] proved that the
minimum cheating probability is 0.739, and presented a
protocol achieving this bias. Thus, for bit commitment,
weak coin flipping, and strong coin flipping the achiev-
ability bounds are tight with the known protocols.
For OT on the other hand, the situation is not as clear.
Classically, it is impossible to achieve even limited secu-
rity for OT in the information-theoretic setting, since
one party can always cheat with certainty. On the other
hand, quantum mechanics allows for imperfect protocols,
in which the participants are able to cheat but their abil-
ities are limited.
OT is a fundamental primitive in cryptography. Its
importance stems from the fact that it can be used as
the foundation for secure two-party computations; with
oblivious transfer, all secure two-party computations are
possible [8, 9]. OT exists in many different flavours, all
with slightly different definitions and notions of security.
It was first introduced informally in 1970 by Wiesner as
“a means for transmitting two messages either but not
both of which may be received” [10], and subsequently
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2formalised as 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (1-2 OT) in
[11]. In related work, Rabin [12] introduced a proto-
col (now called Rabin OT), which was later shown by
Cre´peau [13] to be classically equivalent to 1-2 OT, in
the sense that if it is possible to do one, it is possible
to use this to implement the other. Various “weaker”
variants of OT have also been proposed, most notably
Generalised OT, XOR OT and Universal OT [14], but all
have been shown to be equivalent to 1-2 OT [15] in the
classical setting. The equivalence is believed to also hold
in the quantum setting, but the reduction proofs may
need to be revised. There is also work by Damg˚ard, Fehr,
Salvail and Schaffner [16] who define OT in a slightly dif-
ferent way, and characterise security in terms of informa-
tion leakage. With these definitions (and their quantum
counterparts), the authors describe a 1-2 OT protocol
which is secure in the bounded quantum storage model.
Spacetime-constrained quantum OT protocols have also
been proposed [17], requiring agents at different locations
in spacetime, giving constraints on where in spacetime bit
values can be obtained. Recently, a device-independent
quantum XOR oblivious transfer protocol was proposed
[18]. The protocol uses a shared entangled state to reveal
cheating.
In this paper we consider stand-alone quantum pro-
tocols for 1-2 OT, including an experimental implemen-
tation of such a protocol, and are concerned only with
information-theoretic security. As mentioned above, per-
fect security in this setting is impossible. The best known
lower bound on the achievable bias in 1-2 OT protocols
is due to Chailloux, Gutoski and Sikora [19], who show
that the minimum cheating probability is at least 2/3 if
participants are “semi-honest”. With the definition of
cheating used in [19], with “semi-honest” participants,
this bound is tight. However, the best known OT pro-
tocol has a cheating probability of 0.75 if parties are not
assumed to be semi-honest [20], meaning that there is a
gap between what is known to be achievable, and what
is known to be impossible. Narrowing this gap either
way – obtaining higher and thus tighter lower bounds
on cheating probabilities, or finding concrete protocols
with smaller cheating probabilities, leading to lower up-
per bounds – is the main target of this paper. In order to
obtain lower upper bounds, we consider general classes
of protocols (either completely general or with some re-
strictions), but limit the capabilities of adversaries. This
therefore provides only lower bounds on cheating proba-
bilities, applicable to all protocols within the considered
class. To obtain upper bounds on cheating probabilities,
we give a specific protocol, and then consider the most
general attacks. This therefore provides an upper bound
on achievable cheating probabilities, in the sense that the
best protocol can perform at least as well as the specific
protocol we give. There is also a subtlety regarding the
requirement of semi-honesty, and related to this, to what
extent dishonest parties can always obtain the informa-
tion they would have obtained if they had been honest
especially when considering variants of oblivious transfer
that are not deterministic. We will return to this below.
Our paper contains four main contributions:
1. We introduce the concept of Semi-random OT and
prove a functional equivalence with respect to the
cheating probabilities between 1-2 OT and Semi-
random OT. We further describe a general frame-
work for Semi-random OT.
2. We use this framework to show that the minimum
achievable bound on the cheating probability is 2/3.
This agrees with the result in [19] for regular (deter-
ministic) oblivious transfer, but in our case we do
not assume that parties are semi-honest. We also
increase the lower bound on the minimum achiev-
able cheating probability for 1-2 quantum OT pro-
tocols to 0.749 if the states in the final round of the
protocol when the parties are honest are pure and
symmetric. We parametrise Alice’s and Bob’s abil-
ity to cheat in terms of a single variable F , related
to the fidelity of the protocol output states. This
parametrisation suggests how to construct schemes
when either sender or receiver dishonesty is pri-
oritized. That is, sender and receiver can have
different cheating probabilities, and one can derive
bounds for such situations. Such a scenario arises in
the context of quantum signature schemes [21, 22],
and the derived bounds may prove useful for un-
derstanding the potential application of imperfect
OT to signatures.
3. We illustrate our construction by giving an OT
protocol relying on unambiguous state elimination
(USE) measurements. The protocol improves on
previous protocols in the sense that it decreases
the cheating probability of the receiver and is eas-
ier to implement. It also highlights the connection
between USE measurements and 1-2 OT, and pro-
vides a new application for this relatively seldom
used type of measurement. The security param-
eters achieved are almost tight with the bounds
for protocols using pure symmetric states proven
in this paper. In this protocol, one party has a
smaller cheating probability than the other. This
is not captured by the overall cheating probability,
defined as the maximum of the cheating probabili-
ties of either party. Such protocols might however
be used for applications where restricting cheat-
ing by one party is prioritised. Such a protocol
can also be combined with a “trivial” protocol,
to achieve a protocol with lower average cheat-
ing probability, where both sender and receiver can
cheat with probability at most 0.74. This is lower
than the bound for protocols using pure symmetric
states and constitutes an improvement on previ-
ously known protocols.
4. Last, but not least, we present an optical realisation
of the protocol we have given. Optimal cheating
3strategies for each of the parties were also imple-
mented. Our protocol requires honest parties to use
only the same experimental components as stan-
dard BB84 quantum key distribution. Our setup
is slightly different, in order to enable realisation
of also optimal cheating strategies in particular for
the sender. Cheating requires the sender to pre-
pare an entangled state. The experimental results
for both honest and cheating parties agree well with
theoretical values, demonstrating that the protocol
is feasible.
The paper is organised as follows. We begin in Section
II by defining 1-2 OT and Semi-random OT, stating an
equivalence between the cheating probabilities for each.
In Section III we describe a general framework for Semi-
random OT protocols and consider specific undetectable
cheating strategies always available to Alice and Bob. We
analyse these strategies to lower bound the achievable
cheating probabilities for unbounded adversaries in 1-2
OT. In Section IV we first introduce unambiguous mea-
surements, in particular unambiguous state elimination
(USE) measurements, and motivate their use in cryptog-
raphy. We describe a semi-random OT protocol which
employs USE measurements and analyse its security in
the asymptotic limit. In Section V, we present the ex-
perimental implementation of this protocol.
II. DEFINITIONS
Intuitively, 1-2 OT is a two-party protocol in which
Alice chooses two input bits, x0 and x1, and Bob chooses
a single input bit b. The protocol outputs xb to Bob with
the guarantees that Alice does not know b, and that Bob
does not know xb⊕1. A cheating Alice aims to find the
value of b, while a cheating Bob aims to correctly guess
both x0 and x1.
Definition 1. [20] A 1-2 quantum OT protocol is a pro-
tocol between two parties, Alice and Bob, such that
• Alice has inputs x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1} and Bob has input b ∈
{0, 1}. At the beginning of the protocol, Alice has no
information about b and Bob has no information about
(x0, x1).
• At the end of the protocol, Bob outputs y or Abort and
Alice can either Abort or not.
• If Alice and Bob are honest, they never Abort, y =
xb, Alice has no information about b and Bob has no
information about xb⊕1.
• AOT := sup{Pr[Alice correctly guesses b ∧ Bob does
not Abort]}
= 12 + A
• BOT := sup{Pr[Bob correctly guesses (x0, x1) ∧ Alice
does not Abort]}
= 12 + B
The suprema are taken over all cheating strategies
available to Alice and Bob. We note that there are also
less common variants of the definition of BOT , all with
subtly different cheating implications. Ref. [24] defines
cheating in terms of Bob being able to guess the XOR
of Alice’s bits, while Ref. [19] defines cheating in terms
of Bob’s ability to guess both bits, while also requiring
that Bob can always retrieve a single bit with certainty.
The choice of which definition is most appropriate will
be largely application dependent.
We define pC := max{AOT , BOT } to be the cheating
probability of the protocol. The maximum cheating prob-
ability characterises the performance of an OT protocol
since protocols with (AOT = 1, BOT = 0.5) are easy
to construct. However, for certain applications, keep-
ing track of cheating probabilities for both parties may
be relevant. For example, it is conceivable that there are
applications for which a protocol with cheating probabil-
ities (0.76, 0.5) may be better than one with (0.75, 0.75),
and that protocols with same maximum cheating proba-
bility could be ordered with respect to the smaller cheat-
ing probability. Note also that our definition of security,
while commonly used, differs from that in some other
works, for example [23], where security is characterised
in terms of the information leakage, or in terms of Bob’s
ability to guess the output of some function f(x0, x1).
Nevertheless, our simpler definition makes sense if we are
interested only in lower bounds on the cheating proba-
bility, since the ability to guess (x0, x1) automatically
implies the ability to guess f(x0, x1) for any f .
In this paper we define a variant of OT, Semi-random
OT, which differs from the above 1-2 OT in that Bob
does not have any inputs and randomly obtains one of
Alice’s bit values. More concretely, Semi-random OT is
defined below.
Definition 2. 1-2 quantum Semi-random OT, or simply
Semi-random OT, is a protocol between two parties, Alice
and Bob, such that
• Alice chooses two input bits (x0, x1) ∈ {0, 1} or Abort.
• Bob outputs two bits (c, y) or Abort.
• If Alice and Bob are honest, they never Abort, y = xc,
Alice has no information about c and Bob has no infor-
mation on xc⊕1. Further, x0, x1 and c are uniformly
random bits 1.
• AOT := sup{Pr[Alice correctly guesses c ∧ Bob does
not Abort]}
= 12 + A
1 As also stated in [19], it is standard to assume, in this setting,
that an honest party’s input bits are uniformly random, so that
the corresponding cheating probabilities are computed on aver-
age.
4• BOT := sup{Pr[Bob correctly guesses (x0, x1) ∧ Alice
does not Abort]}
= 12 + B
The reason for introducing Semi-random OT is that we
have found it simpler to work with than 1-2 OT, and the
ability to perform Semi-random OT with cheating prob-
abilities AOT and BOT implies being able to perform 1-2
quantum OT with the same cheating probabilities using
additional classical communication and processing (See
Appendix A). Moreover, in spite of the equivalence in
the above sense, semi-random protocols where Bob does
not choose which bit he obtains can be subtly different
from protocols where Bob can choose his input, in the
following sense. In a semi-random protocol, such as the
example protocol we give in section IV, Bob obtains Al-
ice’s 1st or 2nd bit at random2. In other words, the
protocol is not deterministic, even when parties honestly
follow the protocol, and it generally involves a destructive
quantum measurement. In order to obtain his “honest”
output, Bob needs to irreversibly disturb the quantum
state he possesses. In earlier papers [3, 19] it is assumed,
correctly for their framework, that Bob can always make
a non-destructive measurement to obtain the bit of his
choice. Bounds derived in this way then do not directly
apply to Semi-random OT protocols, where such a mea-
surement does not exist. Nevertheless, semi-random OT
can be used to implement “regular” OT, using classi-
cal post-processing as described in Appendix A. There
are subtle differences when considering how such post-
processing affects lower and upper bounds on cheating.
Here we directly obtain the same bound as in [19], but
by considering semi-random protocols. Our new tech-
nique also enables us to both increase the lower bound
for protocols which use symmetric pure states, and to
lower the upper bound by constructing a protocol with
smaller cheating probabilities averaged over both parties.
III. GENERIC PROTOCOL
In this section we introduce a general framework for
Semi-random OT and use it to prove lower bounds on pC .
We present undetectable cheating strategies available to
Alice and Bob and analyse them to lower bound their
cheating probabilities AOT and BOT respectively. We
show that for protocols within this framework, it holds
that
pC = max{AOT , BOT } ≥ 2/3. (1)
Further, if the states output to Bob by the protocol, when
both parties are honest, are pure and symmetric, then
pC = max{AOT , BOT } & 0.749. (2)
2 A mechanism producing true randomness is a destructive quan-
tum measurement.
We will prove this by bounding Alice’s and Bob’s cheat-
ing probabilities with respect to a single parameter, F ,
which is related to the fidelity of the output states of the
protocol when it is honestly executed. (When either of
the parties are dishonest, the output states may natu-
rally be different.) From this we find that there is always
a trade-off; as Alice’s ability to cheat decreases, Bob’s
ability increases, and vice versa.
For this special case of pure symmetric output states,
our result can be improved, giving an increased lower
bound on the cheating probabilities. For protocols with
pure symmetric output states, this nearly closes the gap
between the known lower bounds, and the upper bounds
resulting from existing protocols. We note that all 1-2
OT protocols we have seen proposed have output states
that are pure and symmetric. Although there is no reason
why this must be the case in general, protocols would in-
tuitively often have this property. As we will later show,
however, there exist protocols with lower average cheat-
ing probabilities than what is possible for protocols where
the output states are pure and symmetric.
A. Protocol Framework
We now describe the general framework for Semi-
random OT protocols with N rounds of communication
between Alice and Bob. This framework is based on
Kitaev’s construction for strong coin flipping [4] and is
useful for analysing the security of Semi-random OT. In
Appendix A, we further motivate why this framework is
general for Semi-random OT.
1. Bob starts with the state ρBM and Alice starts with
an auxiliary system A initialised to |0〉 〈0|A. The
overall state is ρBMA := ρBM ⊗ |0〉 〈0|A. We fur-
ther suppose that Alice and Bob share the counter
variable i, initialised to 1, which tracks the round
number of the protocol.
2. Alice randomly selects an element x0x1 ∈
{00, 01, 11, 10}.
3. Bob sends system M to Alice.
4. Based on her choice in Step 2, Alice per-
forms the unitary operation Ux0x1,iMA ∈
{U00,iMA, U01,iMA, U11,iMA, U10,iMA}.
5. Alice sends system M back to Bob.
6. Bob performs the unitary operation V
(i)
BM .
7. The index i is incremented by 1. If i = N + 1, the
protocol proceeds to Step 8, otherwise it returns to
Step 3.
8. The final output held by Bob is
σx0x1BM := TrA(η
x0x1
BMA), (3)
5where
ηx0x1BMA := V
(n)
BMU
x0x1,n
MA . . . V
(1)
BMU
x0x1,1
MA ◦ ρBMA, (4)
and we have used the convention U ◦ ρ = Uρ U†.
9. Bob performs a POVM with elements
{Π0∗BM ,Π1∗BM ,Π∗0BM ,Π∗1BM} to obtain the value
of c and xc. The position of the star “∗” deter-
mines the value of c, i.e. c = 0 for 0∗ and 1∗, while
c = 1 for ∗0 and ∗1. The value of the “non-star”
entry is the actual value of xc. For example, the
outcome Π1∗BM denotes that c = 0 and x0 = 1.
The steps of the framework above describes the actions
of Alice and Bob if they are honest, together with the
associated outputs, assuming that all measurements are
deferred to the end. Of course, Alice’s and Bob’s actual
actions may deviate from the honest protocol description
if they are dishonest, but we will see that to obtain our
lower bound, this framework is useful.
B. Alice and Bob both honest
For the protocol to be correct if both Alice and Bob
are honest, we require the following conditions to hold:
For c = 0: Tr(Πj∗BMσ
kl
BM ) =
{
1/2, if j = k,
0, if j 6= k. (5)
For c = 1: Tr(Π∗jBMσ
kl
BM ) =
{
1/2, if j = l,
0, if j 6= l. (6)
These conditions imply that Bob receives either one of
Alice’s two chosen bits with equal probability, and that
the bit received by Bob is correct.
C. Security against Bob
We assume that Bob acts honestly throughout the pro-
tocol, until step 9, where he deviates in the final mea-
surement. This is clearly not the most general way of
cheating for Bob, but any cheating probability that Bob
can achieve by cheating in this restricted way can also
be achieved by an unrestricted Bob. We will therefore
be able to derive a lower bound on Bob’s general cheat-
ing probability. Bob, at the beginning of step 9 (mea-
surement), then holds either σ00BM , σ
01
BM , σ
11
BM , or σ
10
BM .
In order to cheat, Bob wants to guess the exact value
of x0 and x1. That is, he wants to know which of the
four σ states he holds. To do this, his optimal strat-
egy would be to perform a minimum-error measurement.
However, the minimum-error measurement will vary ac-
cording to the states chosen by any specific implemen-
tation of Semi-random OT. Instead, to provide a lower
bound on Bob’s optimal cheating probability for all pro-
tocols described by the framework, we assume that Bob
performs a Square Root Measurement (SRM) [25]. This
may not be his optimal strategy, but it is a valid cheat-
ing strategy, and a strategy that Bob can employ with-
out even being caught (since Alice has no way of knowing
which measurement Bob performs). Bob’s cheating prob-
ability is then at least as large as the success probability
of the SRM, which is bounded as [26]
pSRMsucc ≥ 1−
1
8
∑
jk 6=lm
F (σjkBM , σ
lm
BM ), (7)
where jk, lm ∈ {00, 01, 11, 10} and F is the fidelity, de-
fined as
F (ρ, σ) := Tr
(√
ρ1/2σρ1/2
)
. (8)
Eqs. (5) and (6) imply that F (σjkBM , σ
j⊕1,k⊕1
BM ) = 0 (since
these states can be perfectly distinguished). Without loss
of generality, suppose that σ00BM and σ
01
BM are the pair of
states with the highest fidelity. Define
F := F (σ00BM , σ
01
BM ). (9)
Then it follows that
BOT ≥ 1− F. (10)
This result is limited somewhat by the bound on the
success probability of the SRM for general states given in
Eq. (7). Placing restrictions on the output states of the
protocol allows us to tighten this bound. In particular,
if {σ00BM , σ01BM , σ11BM , σ10BM} forms a symmetric set 3 of
pure states for which 0 ≤ F ≤ 1/2, then Bob’s SRM
measurement is successful with probability [27]
p˜SRMsucc =
1
4
(
1 +
1
2
√
1− 2F + 1
2
√
1 + 2F
)2
, (11)
which gives the tighter bound BpureOT ≥ p˜SRMsucc . (As we will
see below, F > 1/2 would mean that Alice’s cheating
probability is greater than 3/4.)
If Bob’s ability to cheat does not depend on Alice’s
random choice of input, it seems likely that most pro-
tocols would output symmetric states, and this tighter
bound would apply. However, the example protocol we
present in section IV, which uses symmetric pure states,
can be combined with a trivial protocol, to obtain overall
average cheating probabilities which are lower than the
bound for protocols using symmetric pure states. This
shows that interestingly, protocols using symmetric pure
states are not optimal for Semi-Random OT in general.
3 Symmetric sets of states are ubiquitous in quantum information.
In this context “symmetric” means that there exists a permuting
unitary U such that U4 = 1 and σ00BM = U ◦σ01BM = U2 ◦σ11BM =
U3 ◦ σ10BM .
6D. Security against Alice
Suppose Alice is dishonest and aims to guess the value
of c output to Bob. In this section we present a cheating
strategy that is always available to Alice, and which is
always undetectable. We derive Alice’s cheating proba-
bility given that she performs this specific strategy, and
use this to obtain a lower bound for Alice’s achievable
cheating probability given that she performs some opti-
mal strategy, in the same way we restricted Bob’s attacks
to obtain a lower bound for his cheating probability.
The strategy that Alice employs intuitively does the
following. She chooses the two classical two-bit inputs
that correspond to the pair of states among the σjkBM with
the highest fidelity, which we called F above. Then she
performs the protocol operations corresponding to either
classical input, conditioned on an ancillary qubit which
is prepared in a superposition state, and which she keeps.
In other words, the global state (before Bob’s measure-
ment) will be an entangled superposition, involving the
pair of output states σjkBM with the highest fidelity on
Bob’s side. Bob then makes the measurement he makes
if honest. Conditioned on his outcome, Alice’s ancillary
qubit is prepared in one of two states. Alice can distin-
guish between the two states with a success probability
determined by the fidelity F between the two states on
Bob’s side. (Her success probability is greater than 1/2,
which would correspond to a random guess by Alice.)
This leads us to a bound on Alice’s cheating probability
that involves the same quantity F as our bound on Bob’s
cheating probability.
More specifically, Alice can proceed as follows. Let
|Ψ〉BMAE be a purification of ρBMA, where E denotes
the environment. Alice also prepares an additional state
|+〉D = (|0〉D + |1〉D)/
√
2 for use as a control qubit to
perform her strategy. Since we consider information-
theoretic security, Alice can do anything allowed within
quantum mechanics, including this. The overall state is
1√
2
(|Ψ〉BMAE |0〉D + |Ψ〉BMAE |1〉D) , (12)
with Alice in complete control of systems A, E and D.
Without loss of generality, we again assume that the two
σ states with the highest fidelity are σ00BM and σ
01
BM . A
valid cheating strategy available to Alice is as follows.
In each Step 4 of the protocol, rather than performing a
unitary Ux0x1,iMA , Alice instead performs
U00,iMA ⊗ |0〉〈0|D + U01,iMA ⊗ |1〉〈1|D. (13)
Defining Alice’s overall operations as
U = V (N)BMU00,NMA . . . V (1)BMU00,1MA and V =
V
(N)
BMU
01,N
MA . . . V
(1)
BMU
01,1
MA , Alice’s strategy leads to
an output state
|χ〉 := 1√
2
(U |Ψ〉BMAE |0〉D + V |Ψ〉BMAE |1〉D)
:=
1√
2
(∣∣ψ00〉
BMAE
|0〉D +
∣∣ψ01〉
BMAE
|1〉D
)
.
(14)
This strategy is not detectable by Bob, since without
access to system D it is as if Alice has performed the
honest operations for either x = 00 or x = 01, each
with probability 1/2. The states
∣∣ψjk〉 are purifications
of σjkBM , and all purifications are related by a unitary
operation acting on the purifying system alone. Alice
further performs the unitary operation
W
(1)
AE ⊗ |0〉 〈0|D +W (2)AE ⊗ |1〉 〈1|D , (15)
where W
(1)
AE and W
(2)
AE are chosen to transform
∣∣ψ00〉 and∣∣ψ01〉 into ∣∣φ00〉 and ∣∣φ01〉, such that the latter two states
are the purifications of σ00BM and σ
01
BM with the highest
overlap. This operation is performed so that we can later
use Uhlmann’s theorem to express Alice’s cheating prob-
ability in terms of F , as we shall see. The resulting state
is
|Φ〉 := 1√
2
(∣∣φ00〉
BMAE
|0〉D +
∣∣φ01〉
BMAE
|1〉D
)
. (16)
In Step 8 of the protocol, Bob performs the POVM
{ΠzBM}z on |Φ〉, where z ∈ {0∗, 1∗, ∗0, ∗1}. Our aim is
to discover how well Alice can distinguish between the
outcomes c = 0 and c = 1 using a measurement on her D
system. The state of system D following Bob’s POVM is
µD =
1
2
∑
i,j,z
〈
φ0i
∣∣ΠzMB ∣∣φ0j〉 |j〉 〈i|D , (17)
where i, j ∈ {0, 1}, z ∈ {0∗, 1∗, ∗0, ∗1}.
Eqs. (5) and (6) can be used to evaluate terms of the
form 〈φjk|ΠzBM |φjk〉, since
〈φjk|ΠzBM |φjk〉 = TrBMAE
(
ΠzBM
∣∣φjk〉 〈φjk∣∣ )
= TrBM (Π
z
BMσ
jk
BM ).
(18)
The expression for µD can be further simplified using the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. For all values of z ∈ {0∗, 1∗, ∗0, ∗1} and jk ∈
{00, 01, 11, 10} such that TrBM (ΠzBMσjkBM ) = 0, it holds
that
(ΠzBM ⊗ 1AE)
∣∣φjk〉
BMAE
= 0. (19)
Proof. Since ΠzBM ⊗ 1AE is a positive semidefinite oper-
ator, we can write its spectral decomposition as
ΠzBM ⊗ 1AE =
∑
n
cn |cn〉 〈cn| , (20)
where all cn are positive real numbers. Therefore, using
Eq. (18),
TrBM (Π
z
BMσ
jk
BM ) = 0⇒ 〈φjk|ΠzBM ⊗ 1AE |φjk〉 = 0
⇒ 〈ci|φjk〉 = 0 ∀i,
(21)
and the result follows.
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µD =
1
2
[
1
2
|0〉〈0|D + 〈φ01|Π0∗MB |φ00〉|0〉〈1|D+
〈φ00|Π0∗MB |φ01〉|1〉〈0|D +
1
2
|1〉〈1|D
]
+
1
2
[
1
2
|0〉〈0|D + 1
2
|1〉〈1|D
]
=
1
2
µc=0D +
1
2
µc=1D ,
(22)
where the first square bracket corresponds to Bob ob-
taining an outcome c = 0 (i.e. Π0∗ or Π1∗) and the
second square bracket corresponds to Bob obtaining an
outcome c = 1 (i.e. Π∗0 or Π∗1). Lastly, we must evalu-
ate 〈φ01|Π0∗MB |φ00〉.
To satisfy no-signalling, the density matrix in system
D must be the same regardless of whether or not Bob
actually performs his measurement [28–32]. If Bob per-
forms no measurement, using Eq. (16), the state of sys-
tem D is
1
2
[|0〉〈0|D + 〈φ01|φ00〉|0〉〈1|D
+ 〈φ00|φ01〉|1〉〈0|D + |1〉〈1|D].
(23)
Comparing Eqs. (22) and (23), we must have
〈φ01|Π0∗MB |φ00〉 = 〈φ01|φ00〉. The trace distance between
µc=0D and µ
c=1
D is therefore |〈φ01|φ00〉|, meaning that Alice
can distinguish c = 0 from c = 1 with probability
p =
1
2
(
1 + |〈φ01|φ00〉|)
=
1
2
(
1 + F (σ00BM , σ
01
BM )
)
:=
1
2
(1 + F ) ,
(24)
where the second equality follows from Uhlmann’s the-
orem [33] since
∣∣φ00〉 and ∣∣φ01〉 are the purifications of
σ00BM and σ
01
BM with maximum overlap. It therefore holds
that
AOT ≥ 1
2
(1 + F ) . (25)
E. Result
Previously, the best known lower bound for the cheat-
ing probabilities in 1-2 quantum OT was [19]
max{AOT , BOT } ≥ 2/3. (26)
Our results in the previous section reproduce this bound
since
AOT ≥ 1
2
(1 + F ), BOT ≥ 1− F
⇒ min
F
(
max{AOT , BOT }
)
=
2
3
.
(27)
Our way to obtain this bound differs substantially from
[19] in two ways, and this means (as we will show later)
that when imposing further restrictions on the class of
protocols, we can increase the lower bound.
If we consider protocols where the output states, dur-
ing an honest execution, are pure and symmetric, then
we obtain a tighter lower bound (which cannot be ob-
tained using the technique in [19]). Specifically, we can
use Eq. (11) to obtain the tighter bound
min
F
(
max{AOT , BOT }
)
≈ 0.749. (28)
Protocols using symmetric states may be preferrable due
to theoretical or experimental simplicity, and intuitively,
one might expect optimal protocols to employ symmetric
states.
Finally, another important feature of our bounding
method is that our construction quantifies the trade-
offs possible between AOT and BOT , something of im-
portance for applications where one is more interested
in a smaller value for one of the two. This exact situ-
ation arises in the context of quantum signatures [22],
where, in the distribution stage, signing keys are par-
tially distributed in a manner reminiscent of 1-2 OT. In
these protocols AOT is prioritised, and it is important
that AOT ≈ 0.5 to protect against repudiation attempts.
On the other hand, to protect against forging attempts
is much simpler, and the requirements on BOT are less
strict. The parametrisation of AOT in terms of F sug-
gests that in order to create an imperfect 1-2 OT schemes
with a small A, it is necessary to have a protocol which,
in the honest case, outputs states that are almost orthog-
onal. Unfortunately, given AOT ≈ 0.5, our results show
that it is necessary to have BOT ≈ 1. This mirrors a
similar result for two-party computation [34].
IV. A PROTOCOL FOR OBLIVIOUS
TRANSFER
In this section we present a protocol for imperfect
quantum oblivious transfer which achieves cheating prob-
abilities of 3/4 and approximately 0.729 for sender and
receiver respectively. The protocol uses unambiguous
quantum state elimination.
A. Unambiguous Measurements
Suppose that a quantum system is prepared in one
of the states ρx, where x ∈ X , with prior probabilities
px. When retrieving the information stored in ρ
x using
an “optimal” measurement, what is “optimal” depends
heavily on the application. For communication proto-
cols, a minimum-error measurement – one which identi-
fies the state with the smallest probability of error – is
just one possibility. For cryptographic protocols, the op-
timal measurement is often one which returns the largest
8possible amount of information while simultaneously dis-
turbing the system less than a threshold amount.
A particular class of measurements we are interested
in is unambiguous measurements. These measurements
give “perfect” information in the sense that, given a suc-
cessful measurement outcome, one can be certain that
the decoded classical information is correct. Unambigu-
ous measurements come in two main flavours: unambigu-
ous state discrimination (USD), and unambiguous state
elimination (USE). A successful USD measurement on ρx
would identify x with certainty, but the measurement is
generally not successful with probability 1. When the
measurement is unsuccessful it does not uniquely deter-
mine the state.
USE measurements [35–43] on the other hand can more
often be successful with probability 1, but only guaran-
tee that x /∈ Y ⊂ X , i.e. the measurement rules out
states rather than definitively identifying the state. In-
tuitively, it seems that unambiguous measurements are
well suited to cryptographic applications – their abil-
ity to provide “perfect yet partial” information on the
states being sent is often exactly what is needed. More
concretely, USD can be seen as very similar to Rabin
OT, in which it is desired that the receiver obtains the
sender’s message with probability 1/2, and otherwise re-
ceives nothing with probability 1/2. On the other hand,
USE measurements seem closely related to the more com-
mon 1-2 OT, in which incomplete but correct information
is gained with certainty. Since OT plays a central role
in secure two-party computation, it seems likely that un-
ambiguous measurements could also play a role in this
developing field.
B. Semi-random OT using Unambiguous State
Elimination
In this section, we present an application of USE mea-
surements. We describe a protocol for implementing
many runs of Semi-random OT and analyse its secu-
rity in the asymptotic limit. We again work in the
information–theoretic security setting but this time prove
upper bounds on the cheating probabilities achievable for
Alice and Bob. We show that our protocol performs bet-
ter than previous protocols, and is almost optimal with
respect to the bounds for symmetric pure states derived
in the previous section. The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. Alice uniformly, randomly and independently se-
lects N elements from the set X = {00, 01, 11, 10}.
She encodes elements as 00 → |00〉, 01 → | + +〉,
11 → |11〉 and 10 → | − −〉, where |±〉 = (|0〉 ±
|1〉)/√2.
2. Alice sends the N two-qubit states to Bob.
3. Bob randomly selects
√
N out of the N states he
has received and asks Alice to reveal their iden-
tity 4. If Alice declares |+ +〉 or | − −〉, then Bob
measures both qubits in the X basis, otherwise he
measures both qubits in the Z basis. The protocol
aborts if any measurement result does not match
Alice’s declaration.
4. The
√
N states used in the previous step are dis-
carded.
5. For each of the N−√N remaining states, Bob mea-
sures the first qubit in the Z basis and the second
qubit in the X basis. These measurements consi-
tute two USE measurements (for example, an out-
come of |0〉 on the first qubit rules out |11〉). Fol-
lowing these measurements, Bob can with certainty
rule out one element from the set Y0 = {00, 11},
and one from the set Y1 = {01, 10}. In this way,
for each of the remaining states he can know with
certainty exactly one of x0 and x1, but not both.
The result of this protocol is that Alice and Bob have
performed N − √N runs of Semi-random OT, each of
which could be used to implement a single instance of
1-2 OT, as per the construction in Appendix A. Below
we analyse the cheating probabilities achieved by each
instance of Semi-random OT generated by this protocol.
Note that, from a security perspective, the scheme
above can be set in the general framework considered
in the previous section by defining U = R⊗R, where
R = |+〉〈0| − |−〉〈1|. (29)
Alice begins with the state |00〉 and applies either 1, U ,
U2 or U3 to obtain either |00〉, | + +〉, |11〉 or | − −〉
respectively. The subsequent rounds simply consist of
classical communication and measurements, the latter of
which can be described as a unitary operation acting on
a larger Hilbert space, with state collapse delayed until a
protocol output is required. We show that this protocol
can be made secure with AOT = 0.75 and BOT ≈ 0.729.
C. Security against Bob
If Bob wants to cheat, then his aim is to correctly guess
both x0 and x1 for each individual pair. In the asymp-
totic limit, the fraction of states discarded for testing in
Step 3 tends to zero. Since the states are prepared inde-
pendently, any strategy Bob performs (including general
measurements correlated across all N states) cannot have
an average success probability (probability of correctly
identifying both x0 and x1) which is greater than the
4 The choice of
√
N test bits is somewhat arbitrary. For security
in the asymptotic case, we only need Bob to choose a number of
test states such that the number of test states tends to infinity
as N increases; the fraction of states chosen for testing tends to
zero as N increases.
9minimum-error measurement on a single state 5. There-
fore, in the asymptotic limit we can bound Bob’s average
cheating probability for each of the N−√N ≈ N runs by
considering the minimum-error measurement on a single
state. Since the set S := {|00〉, |+ +〉, |11〉, | −−〉} forms
a set of symmetric pure states, the minimum-error mea-
surement is the SRM [27]. Using this measurement Bob
can guess both of Alice’s input bits with probability
BOT =
1
4
(
1 +
1√
2
)2
≈ 0.729. (30)
In this case, Bob’s optimal strategy is the exact strategy
considered in the general scenario in Section III C. (If the
tested fraction of states does not tend to zero as N →∞,
then Bob’s optimal measurement would be a maximum
confidence measurement [32, 44], with a success probabil-
ity increasing with the fraction of tested states, reaching
a maximum of 3/4 if at least 1/4 of the states are tested.
Bob would then perform the relevant measurement with
higher confidence in the result, and if the measurement
fails, ask to “test” the state in that position.)
D. Security against Alice
If Alice wants to cheat, her aim is to correctly guess
the value of c such that Bob received xc. To do this, she
may send states other than the ones in S. In general,
Alice will generate ρAB11B12B21B22...BN1BN2 and send the
B systems to Bob, keeping the A system for herself. In
Step 3 of the protocol Bob then randomly selects a pair
of the qubits he received, say ρBk1Bk2 , and asks Alice
to declare the identity of the state. He does this for√
N of the N pairs. Since we are looking for an upper
bound on Alice’s capabilities, we assume that she holds
a purification |Ψ〉Bk1Bk2A of ρBk1Bk2 .
Alice must declare a state to Bob that will agree with
his measurement outcomes in Step 3. If she can do this
with certainty, then the state |Ψ〉Bk1Bk2A must be of the
form
|Ψ〉Bk1Bk2A = b0|00〉Bk1Bk2 |0〉A + b1|+ +〉Bk1Bk2 |1〉A
+ b2|11〉Bk1Bk2 |2〉A + b3| − −〉Bk1Bk2 |3〉A,
(31)
where {|0〉A, |1〉A, |2〉A, |3〉A} is an orthonormal basis.
If Alice does not send states in the above form, then
she cannot guess Bob’s measurement outcomes with cer-
tainty, and for asymptotically large N it becomes virtu-
ally certain that the protocol will abort.
We note that Alice also cannot improve her average
cheating probability by using strategies where she uses
5 If there were such a measurement, Bob could simulate this strat-
egy when he has only a single state and beat the minimum-error
measurement.
entanglement not just between the system she keeps and
Bob’s individual qubit pairs, but where she also intro-
duces entanglement between the different qubit pairs she
sends to Bob. Any state for which Alice will determinis-
tically pass a test on the qubits in position Bk1Bk2, can
be written as
|Ψ〉Bk1Bk2A′ = b0|00〉Bk1Bk2 |0〉A′ + b1|+ +〉Bk1Bk2 |1〉A′
+ b2|11〉Bk1Bk2 |2〉A′ + b3| − −〉Bk1Bk2 |3〉A′ ,
(32)
where {|0〉A′ , |1〉A′ , |2〉A′ , |3〉A′} is an orthonormal basis
which may include not just a system Alice holds, but
Bob’s qubits in other positions than Bk1Bk2. This state
is evidently of the form in (31). That is, if Alice is able to
deterministically pass a test done on a qubit pair, then
this directly limits her average cheating probability for
that qubit pair, and this is true for all qubit pairs also
when Alice can entangle the qubits she sends to Bob in
arbitrary ways.
Essentially, this means that Alice is restricted to the
attacks considered in the general protocol analysis in Sec-
tion III D – attacks that are superpositions of honest op-
erations, and as such are always undetectable by Bob. In
fact, it can be proven (see Appendix B) that an optimal
strategy for Alice is to prepare
1√
2
(|00〉B |0〉A + |+ +〉B |1〉A) , (33)
which corresponds exactly to the operation given in Eq.
(13). Since the overlap between all adjacent states in S is
1/2, Eq. (25) implies that Alice can correctly guess the
value of c with probability 3/4. The analysis in Appendix
B confirms that this is her cheating probability.
E. A combined protocol with lower average
cheating probability
One can combine our example scheme, where AOT =
3/4 and BOT = 0.729, with a “trivial” scheme where
AOT = 1/2 and BOT = 1, to achieve a scheme where
both Alice’s and Bob’s average cheating probabilities are
below 3/4. Note that this is possible because our pro-
tocol had different cheating probabilities for sender and
receiver. This illustrates that the maximum of the two
cheating probabilities does not fully characterise the per-
formance of a protocol, since the smaller cheating prob-
ability can become relevant in such combined protocols.
As in [19], Alice and Bob execute a weak coin flipping
protocol to probabilistically choose between a protocol
that is more favourable to Alice, and one that is more
favourable to Bob. In [19], it is considered in some detail
how to securely compose weak coin flipping and a subse-
quent OT protocol. In the trivial OT scheme we will use,
Alice simply sends Bob both bits, and Bob reads the bit
he wants and discards the other, giving AOT = 1/2 and
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BOT = 1. If our example scheme is chosen with prob-
ability p and the trivial scheme chosen with probability
1− p, the average cheating probabilities become
A˜OT = 3p/4 + (1− p)/2, B˜OT = 0.729p+ (1− p). (34)
Choosing p to set these equal results in a combined
scheme where both Alice and Bob can cheat on aver-
age at most with probability A˜OT = B˜OT = pC ≈ 0.74.
This is the smallest cheating probability that a concrete
protocol can achieve to our knowledge. Interestingly, this
is lower than 0.749 both for Alice and Bob, thus prov-
ing that protocols using symmetric pure states are not
optimal for semi-random oblivious transfer in terms of
average cheating probability.
V. EXPERIMENT
A major advantage of the above protocol is that it can
be realized using standard BB84 quantum key distribu-
tion setup 6. However, we have implemented the semi-
random OT protocol slightly differently to enable also
the realization of optimal cheating strategies. Namely,
we created the Alice’s entangled state with the help of
optical multi-qubit quantum logic gates. But still one
photon carrying a single qubit stays at Alice’s side and
the other photon, carrying two qubits travel to Bob’s
side.
A. Experimental setup
Pairs of 810-nm time-correlated photons were gen-
erated using type-II spontaneous parametric down-
conversion in a β-barium-borate crystal. The photons
were guided to the experimental setup depicted in Fig-
ure 1a. Primarily, the state of the first of the qubits B
chosen by Alice was encoded by quarter- and half-wave
plates (QWP, HWP) into the polarization of the signal
photon. Then a calcite beam displacer (BD) spatially
separated horizontally and vertically polarized compo-
nents into two parallel beams with a lateral distance of
4 mm. This turns the encoding of the first qubit from
polarization to spatial encoding. Wave plates acting on
both parallel beams were then used to encode the state
of the second qubit B into polarization. In this way, a
single photon carried both qubits.
When the basic operation of the semi-random OT was
tested, as well as when Bob’s cheating strategy was im-
plemented, we utilized the idler photon (the other pho-
ton in the pair) only to herald successful generation of
6 Actually, Bob doesn’t need a quantum memory for his test mea-
surements. He can randomly decide to make a test measurement
in the ZZ or the XX basis, and only afterwards ask Alice to
reveal the corresponding states. Half of the test measurements
will not contribute, but this will not affect the function of the
protocol.
the signal photon. When Alice’s cheating strategy was
studied, the state of Alice’s qubit A was encoded into
the polarization state of the idler photon. Linear-optical
quantum logic gates, shown in Figure 1b, then entangled
the input qubits to produce the required state (33).
The two-qubit controlled-phase gate (UCP ) operates
on qubits B and introduces an arbitrary phase shift on
state |11〉. The wave plates in the lower optical path per-
form the phase shift, the wave plates in the upper path
only compensate for the path length difference. Another
half-wave plate implements the Hadamard gate acting
on the second one of qubits B (encoded in the polar-
ization degree of freedom). The three-qubit controlled-
controlled-phase gate (UCCP ) provides a way to entangle
qubit A with qubits B. The beam displacer separates
the path of the idler photon according to its polariza-
tion into two parallel beams with 6-mm spacing. This
extends the Hilbert space, providing room for manipula-
tion. Suitable polarization operations, two-photon inter-
ference, and consecutive coincident detection then con-
stitute the UCCP operation. The two-photon interfer-
ence takes place in the central block of three partially-
polarizing beam splitters (PPBS), the central one with
reflectances RH = 0, RV = 2/3 the other two with
RH = 2/3, RV = 0. This is the core of the gate opera-
tion [45–48] which is explained in detail under Methods
in our previous work [49]. The gate is probabilistic and
succeeds with theoretical probability 1/9 for phase shifts
0 and pi, which are used in the experiment.
Final projective measurements are realised by wave
plates, polarizing beam splitters, and single-photon
avalanche diodes (SPAD). This enables projection onto
an arbitrary product state 7. Electric signals are pro-
cessed by coincidence logic. The overall coincidence
count rate was roughly 330 counts per second. The ex-
perimental integration time was 5 s for each projective-
measurement setting.
B. Both parties are honest
To test the case when both parties are honest, we set
the UCP and UCCP gates to zero phase shift and turned
off the Hadamard operation H.
We sequentially prepared states |00〉, |++〉, |−−〉, |11〉
and measured each of them in ZX basis on Bob’s side.
The probability of Bob correctly receiving one of Alice’s
bits was estimated to be 0.9943(9), where the number
in the brackets represents one standard deviation at the
final decimal place. It means that due to experimental
imperfections, there is a small probability (about 0.6%)
that Bob obtains an erroneous bit value. Complete ex-
perimental data are provided in Table IV of Appendix D.
7 We use a simplified configuration at Bob’s side, but it is possible
to build a four-output measurement spanning the full two-qubit
space solely by linear optics.
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FIG. 1. (a) - Experimental setup. (b) - Quantum circuit diagram of the experiment. With appropriate tuning of controlled-
phase gates UCP, UCCP, and the single-qubit gates U1,2,3, Alice prepares the required state.
The protocol also includes test measurements. If the
parties are honest, this means that the states |00〉, |11〉
are measured in the ZZ basis and states | + +〉, | − −〉
in the XX basis. Such measurements should unambigu-
ously discriminate between the incoming states and Bob
should never abort the protocol when Alice is honest.
But in an experimental implementation imperfections
may cause errors. In our experiment, the average error
probability was 0.013(1). All measured data are provided
in Table V of Appendix D.
C. Bob is cheating
Bob’s optimal cheating strategy is to perform a
minimum-error measurement 8. In our case, this means
measuring the first qubit in the basis
{|ζ0〉 = α |0〉+ β |1〉 , |ζ1〉 = β |0〉 − α |1〉}
and the other in the basis
{|ξ0〉 = α |0〉 − β |1〉 , |ξ1〉 = β |0〉+ α |1〉}
with α = cos(pi/8) and β = sin(pi/8). Each combination
of detector clicks gives Bob a guess of both the Alice’s
bits. The average experimental value of cheating prob-
ability, i.e., the probability of a correct guess of both
bits, was 0.718(5), which is close to the theoretical value
of 0.729. Recorded counts are provided in Table VI of
Appendix D.
8 In this situation it is a square-root measurement, which is actu-
ally quite intuitive: the states |0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉 form a “cross” on
the Bloch sphere. The measurement on the first qubit is repre-
sented by two orthogonal states which lie on the diagonal. The
measurement on the second qubit is different and corresponds to
the other diagonal.
D. Alice is cheating
To test Alice’s optimal cheating strategy, we set the
phase shifts of the gates UCP and UCCP to −138.2◦ and
180◦, respectively. We prepared the input qubits in a
suitable product state and adjusted the output single-
qubit operations U1,2,3 to achieve the desired entangled
state (33). The specific choice of input states, gate pa-
rameters, and unitary operations is a result of numerical
optimization, which is discussed in Appendix C.
In order to verify the prepared entangled state, we per-
formed quantum state tomography [50]. The purity of
the state was P = 0.884 and its fidelity with respect to
the ideal state (33) was F = 0.921. The cause of imper-
fect purity and fidelity is the sensitivity of the UCCP gate
to interferometric phase instability and spatio-temporal
misalignment of the photons. Imperfect wave-plate re-
tardances reduce the quality of the state even further.
To learn which bit was obtained by Bob, Alice mea-
sures her qubit A in the state (33) in the X basis. Honest
Bob makes his measurements according to the protocol.
As described above, Bob’s outcomes |0+〉B , |1−〉B corre-
spond to c = 0 and |1+〉B , |0−〉B correspond to c = 1.
If Alice obtains |+〉A (|−〉A), then she guesses that c = 0
(c = 1). Alice’s measurements in the X basis and Bob’s
measurements in the ZX basis were already contained
in the data from the three-qubit state tomography. We
estimated the cheating probability as the number of de-
tection events in which Bob and Alice obtain the same
value of c, divided by the number of all detection events.
Alice correctly estimated Bob’s bit c with probability
0.77(1). The measured count rates are in Table VII in
Appendix D.
In the case of test measurements, Bob measures in the
ZZ or the XX basis and Alice in the Z basis. These data
were also obtainable from the tomographic measurement.
In theory, Bob should not be able to detect this type
of cheating strategy by Alice. But in the experiment,
there was a small fraction of outcomes telling Bob to
abort the protocol, on average 0.059(6). This fraction
was calculated as the number of counts in which Bob’s
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measurement outcome did not match Alice’s declaration
divided by the total number of counts. The relevant data
are presented in Table VIII of Appendix D.
In our experiment, Alice’s probability of making a cor-
rect guess, 0.77, was higher than the theoretical limit
0.75. But there was also a relatively high probability of
Bob discovering her cheating (0.059, which is higher than
the probability of “false alarm”, 0.013, if Alice was hon-
est). These effects are likely caused by imperfect prepa-
ration of the state (33).
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper we introduced Semi-random oblivious
transfer (OT) and a general framework useful for its
study. We explicitly constructed undetectable cheat-
ing strategies available to Alice and Bob and used them
to lower-bound the cheating probability for any Semi-
random OT protocol within our framework. The derived
bounds are directly transferable to standard 1-2 quantum
OT, allowing us to obtain the lower bound pC ≥ 2/3, but
using different assumptions on cheating strategies than
assuming semi-honest adversaries as done by Chailloux
et al. [19]. Our technique, other than re-deriving the pre-
vious bound, allows us to (i) quantify the trade-off be-
tween cheating probabilities for different parties, which
can be useful for applications where limiting cheating by
one party is prioritised and (ii) obtain tighter bounds if
we impose further restrictions. In particular, if the states
used by honest parties are pure and symmetric, we ob-
tain the bound pC ≥ 0.749, which was not obtained pre-
viously.
Our construction provides a simple quantitative re-
lationship between Alice’s and Bob’s ability to cheat,
and gives new bounds in biased settings. In applica-
tions more sensitive to sender dishonesty than receiver
dishonesty (or vice versa), our parametrisation of AOT
and BOT in terms of the fidelity shows explicitly how
reductions in one party’s ability to cheat will impact
the other’s cheating probability. To illustrate our con-
struction we presented an OT protocol using unambigu-
ous state elimination measurements to achieve cheating
probabilities AOT = 3/4, BOT ≈ 0.729 and therefore
pC = 3/4, together with its experimental realisation. The
cheating probabilities compare favourably with the pre-
viously best known protocol given in Ref. [20] in which
AOT = BOT = 3/4. Unlike for the qutrit protocol pro-
posed in [20], in our example protocol, the bound on Al-
ice’s cheating probability concerns her average cheating
probability. On the other hand, Bob’s cheating proba-
bility is lower (0.729 against 0.75 in [20]), and above all,
our protocol does not require entanglement and can be re-
alised using the same experimental components as BB84
quantum key distribution. A minor modification could
render our protocol even more practical. Bob could, be-
fore asking Alice to reveal any states, randomly select
some qubit pairs and measure them in the same basis,
either the X or the Z basis. He then asks Alice to re-
ceive these states, but only after he has measured these
qubit pairs. If Alice’s declaration does not match his
measurement results, he again aborts. Bob’s test is then
only useful if his selected basis matches the basis states
used by Alice. Another variation would be for Bob to
randomly select which qubit he measured in the X and
which in the Z basis. This makes no difference if Alice
is limited to using undetectable cheating strategies, but
would lead to somewhat improved performance when loss
and imperfections are present and in finite-size scenarios,
where Alice may choose to employ a cheating strategy
that could be detected by Bob with some probability.
Since our example protocol outputs symmetric pure
states, the cheating probabilities achieved are almost
tight with the bounds proven in this paper for this class
of protocols. Combining the example protocol with a
trivial protocol, however, an average cheating probability
pC ≈ 0.74 for both Alice and Bob is possible. It follows
that protocols with pure and symmetric output states
are not optimal. There thus remains a gap between the
known lower bounds on cheating probabilities for quan-
tum oblivious transfer, and what the lowest achievable
cheating probabilities are.
We further note that if two protocols are combined
using weak coin flipping, then the parties know which
protocol actually got implemented. The bound on cheat-
ing probabilities in such combined protocols are there-
fore also only bounds on average cheating probabilities.
For an individual round, the parties are aware that they
have higher or lower cheating probabilities. Related to
this, cheating probabilities do not fully capture how cer-
tain a cheating party can be that the extra information
they have dishonestly obtained is correct. In our example
protocol, Bob can never be certain that his dishonestly
obtained information is correct. He only ever knows that
his guess is correct with probability 0.729. Alice, how-
ever, can be certain of Bob’s bit choice with probability
1/4, and she knows when this occurs. The rest of the
time her guess is right with probability 2/3. This is a
further advantage of our protocol, compared with the
one in [20]. To elaborate, if one probabilistically chooses
between a trivial protocol where Alice can cheat perfectly
and Bob cannot cheat at all (AOT = 1 and BOT = 1/2)
and a trivial protocol where Alice cannot cheat at all
and Bob can cheat perfectly (AOT = 1/2 and BOT = 1),
then the average cheating probabilities for either party
are 3/4, but with probability 1/2, either party knows
for sure that they can cheat perfectly. When executing
the protocol in [20], Alice similarly knows for sure what
Bob’s bit choice was half the time, and the rest of the
time she randomly guesses. In our protocol, Alice is only
sure with probability 1/4. Bob, however, cheats with
a minimum-error measurement both in our protocol and
the one in [20], and is never sure that his guess is correct.
Since the states Bob receives in both protocols are lin-
early dependent, he can never unambiguouosly determine
both of Alice’s bit values. We also presented an optical
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realisation of our protocol. The achieved experimental
performance parameters agree well with the theoretical
values, showing that the protocol is feasible.
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Appendix A: Equivalence between Semi-random
OT, OT, and Random OT
Here we prove the following claim (stated below) con-
tained in the main paper.
Proposition 1. The existence of a Semi-random OT
protocol with cheating probabilities AOT and BOT is
equivalent to the existence of a 1-2 quantum OT protocol
with the same cheating probabilities.
To prove this, we begin by giving the definition of a
related OT variant called Random OT (ROT), as follows.
Definition 3. Random OT is a protocol between two
parties, Alice and Bob, such that
• Alice outputs two bits (x0, x1) ∈ {0, 1} or Abort.
• Bob outputs two bits (c, y) or Abort.
• If Alice and Bob are honest, they never Abort, y = xc,
Alice has no information about c and Bob has no infor-
mation about xc⊕1. Further, x0, x1 and c are uniformly
random bits.
• AOT := sup{Pr[Alice correctly guesses c ∧ Bob does
not Abort]}
= 12 + A
• BOT := sup{Pr[Bob correctly guesses (x0, x1) ∧ Alice
does not Abort]}
= 12 + B
Ref. [20] proved that the existence of a ROT proto-
col with cheating probabilities AOT and BOT is equiva-
lent to the existence of a 1-2 OT with the same cheating
probabilities. Following very similar arguments, in the
following subsections we will show that the existence of
a Semi-random OT protocol with cheating probabilities
AOT and BOT is equivalent to the existence of a ROT
with the same cheating probabilities. This, combined
with the results in Ref. [20], proves the proposition.
1. Semi-random OT from ROT
Let P be a ROT protocol with cheating probabilities
AOT (P ) and BOT (P ). We construct a Semi-random OT
protocol Q with the same cheating probabilities as fol-
lows:
1. Alice has inputs (z0, z1).
2. Alice and Bob run protocol P to output (x0, x1) for
Alice and (c, y) for Bob.
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3. Alice and Bob abort in Q if and only if they abort
in P . Otherwise, Alice sends (z0 ⊕ x0, z1 ⊕ x1) to
Bob.
4. Bob outputs (c, y′) where y′ = (zc ⊕ xc ⊕ y).
We now show that Q is a Semi-random OT protocol with
cheating probabilities AOT (P ) and BOT (P ).
If Alice and Bob are honest, then by definition we have
y = xc and so y
′ = zc. Alice has no information about c
and Bob has no information about zc⊕1, as required.
If Alice is dishonest, she cannot guess c except with
probability AOT (P ) since she only receives communica-
tions from Bob via protocol P . Therefore AOT (Q) =
AOT (P ).
If Bob is dishonest, he holds (z0 ⊕ x0, z1 ⊕ x1) and
aims to guess (z0, z1). This is equivalent to Bob guess-
ing (x0, x1) which he can do with probability BOT (P )
Therefore BOT (Q) = BOT (P ).
2. ROT from Semi-random OT
Let P be a Semi-random OT protocol with cheating
probabilities AOT (P ) and BOT (P ). We construct a ROT
protocol Q with the same cheating probabilities as fol-
lows:
1. Alice picks x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
2. Alice and Bob perform the Semi-random OT proto-
col P where Alice inputs x0, x1. Let (c, y) be Bob’s
outputs.
3. Alice and Bob abort in Q if and only if they abort
in P . Otherwise, the outputs of protocol Q are
(x0, x1) for Alice and (c, y) for Bob.
The outputs of Q are uniformly random bits (if both
parties are honest) since Alice chooses her input at ran-
dom. Note that, in the definition of ROT, the outputs
are only required to be random in the honest case, and
no assertions are made when one party acts dishonestly.
Therefore Q does indeed implement ROT. From the con-
struction of Q it is also clear that AOT (P ) = AOT (Q)
and BOT (Q) = BOT (P ).
3. Semi-random OT from ROT in the general
protocol framework
In order to fully motivate why the protocol framework
in section III A is general for Semi-random OT, we here
sketch how to recast Semi-random OT, realized by per-
forming ROT together with the classical processing as de-
tailed above in A 1, in the form of our general framework.
ROT with classical processing is not immediately in the
form of the general protocol framework for Semi-random
OT, since in a quantum protocol for ROT, Alice has out-
puts which she would obtain through a measurement. In
the general protocol framework in III A, however, Alice
makes no measurements. We also show that the cheating
probabilities do not change when the protocol is recast.
Suppose therefore that Alice obtains her two output
bits in ROT by measuring a part of a quantum system
held by her at some point during the protocol. (If de-
sired, this measurement may be deferred to the end of the
protocol, using the standard technique for this, closely
related to the procedure we will describe below.) Any
POVM may be realized as a projective measurement in
a suitably enlarged Hilbert space [51], with as many di-
mensions as outcomes. We will label this Hilbert space C.
Suppose therefore that in this possibly enlarged Hilbert
space, Alice’s four-outcome measurement has measure-
ment operators Πx0,x1C = |x0, x1〉CC〈x0, x1|, which are
orthonormal projectors on four orthogonal basis states
|x0, x1〉C for x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}. (The construction below
can easily be extended to the case where Alice’s four mea-
surement operators are orthogonal projectors onto more
than one basis state, that is, have rank > 1).
Now, instead of measuring system C to obtain (x0, x1)
and sending (z0 ⊕ x0, z1 ⊕ x1) to Bob, where (z0, z1) are
Alice’s inputs, Alice performs one of the four unitary
transforms
Uz0,z1CD =
∑
x0,x1∈{0,1}
|x0, x1〉CC〈x0, x1| (A1)
⊗|z0 ⊕ x0, z1 ⊕ x1〉DD〈aux|
on system C and an auxiliary system D, where |aux〉D is
a “blank” state that could e.g. be chosen as |0, 0〉. The
states |0, 0〉D, |0, 1〉D, |1, 0〉D, |1, 1〉D form an orthonormal
basis for the four-dimensional D system. She then sends
system D to Bob, who (if he is honest) can measure this
system to obtain (z0 ⊕ x0, z1 ⊕ x1).
This modified protocol for Semi-random OT is now
in the form of the general framework. (If desired, Bob’s
measurements to obtain (z0 ⊕ x0, z1 ⊕ x1) and (c, y)
can be combined into a single measurement by Bob
that directly gives (c, y′).) By no-signalling [28–32], Bob
cannot tell whether or not Alice has measured system
C. Therefore, Bob’s cheating probability remains the
same as if an honest Alice simply had measured system
C and sent him the state |z0⊕x0, z1⊕x1〉. Equivalently,
Bob’s cheating probability is the same as if Alice had
measured system C and sent him the classical bits
(z0 ⊕ x0, z1 ⊕ x1). Since the recast Semi-random OT
protocol is otherwise the same as the ROT protocol
we started with, in particular, how Bob obtains (c, y)
remains the same, Alice’s cheating probabilities are also
equal in both versions of the Semi-random protocol.
That is, cheating probabilities remain the same in the
version that is in the form of the general framework, and
in the version where Alice and Bob perform ROT with
classical processing.
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Appendix B: Alice’s optimal cheating strategy in the
example protocol
Alice, to pass a test by Bob with certainty, has to send
a state of the form
|ψch〉 = a |0〉A ⊗ |00〉B + b |1〉A ⊗ |++〉B
+c |2〉A ⊗ |11〉B + d |3〉A ⊗ |−−〉B , (B1)
where {|1〉A , |2〉A , |3〉A , |4〉A} is an orthonormal basis for
a system A she retains while sending Bob system B, and
|a|2 + |b|2 + |c|2 + |d|2 = 1.
Bob measures the first B qubit in the Z basis and the
second B qubit in the X basis. It holds that
〈0 + |ψch〉 = 1√
2
(a |0〉A + b |1〉A)
〈1 + |ψch〉 = 1√
2
(b |1〉A + c |2〉A)
〈0− |ψch〉 = 1√
2
(a |0〉A + d |3〉A)
〈1− |ψch〉 = −1√
2
(c |2〉A + d |3〉A) . (B2)
These states are the unnormalised states conditionally
prepared on Alice’s side, given Bob’s measurement out-
come. The norm of each of the above states gives the
probability for that outcome on Bob’s side. That is, it
is the probability with which the corresponding state is
prepared.
To successfully cheat, Alice needs to determine
whether Bob received the first or second bit. Bob obtains
the first bit if he obtains (0,+) or (1,−), and the second
bit if he obtains (0,−) or (1,+). It so happens that
each of these outcome combinations occur with probabil-
ity 1/2, irrespective of a, b, c, d. The two density matrices
Alice needs to distinguish between are ρ0 and ρ1, with
1
2
ρ0 = 〈0 + |ψch〉 〈ψch|0+〉+ 〈1− |ψch〉 〈ψch|1−〉 ,
1
2
ρ1 = 〈0− |ψch〉 〈ψch|0−〉+ 〈1 + |ψch〉 〈ψch|1+〉 ,
(B3)
which in matrix form, with the basis states ordered
{|0〉A , |1〉A , |2〉A , |3〉A}, are given by
ρ0 =
 |a|
2 ab∗ 0 0
a∗b |b|2 0 0
0 0 |c|2 cd∗
0 0 c∗d |d|2
 ,
ρ1 =
 |a|
2 0 0 ad∗
0 |b|2 bc∗ 0
0 b∗c |c|2 0
a∗d 0 0 |d|2
 . (B4)
Alice’s optimal measurement is the Helstrom measure-
ment, given by a projection in the eigenbasis of ρ0 − ρ1.
If Alice obtains an outcome corresponding to a positive
eigenvalue, she guesses that Bob obtained the first bit,
and if she obtains an outcome corresponding to a nega-
tive eigenvalue, then she guesses that Bob obtained the
second bit. If Alice obtains an outcome corresponding to
a zero eigenvalue, she can guess either the first or second
bit, without altering her success probability (conditioned
on such an outcome, Bob is equally likely to have ob-
tained the first or second bit). Because the state space
on Bob’s side is three-dimensional, the situation is ef-
fectively three-dimensional on Alice’s side too, but it is
convenient to keep {|0〉A , |1〉A , |2〉A , |3〉A} as a basis.
We therefore need to find the eigenvalues of
ρ0 − ρ1 =
 0 ab
∗ 0 −ad∗
a∗b 0 −bc∗ 0
0 −b∗c 0 cd∗
−a∗d 0 c∗d 0
 . (B5)
The eigenvalues are
λ1 = λ2 = 0, λ3,4 = ±
√
|ab|2 + |bc|2 + |cd|2 + |ad|2
= ±
√
(|a|2 + |c|2)(|b|2 + |d|2). (B6)
where we choose the + sign for λ3. The success proba-
bility is therefore given by
pcheat =
1
2
+
1
4
Tr|ρ0 − ρ1| = 1
2
+
1
4
∑
i
|λi|
=
1
2
(1 +
√
(|a|2 + |c|2)(|b|2 + |d|2). (B7)
Clearly, Alice’s cheating probability is maximised when
|a|2+ |c|2 = |b|2+ |d|2 = 1/2, giving a maximum cheating
probability of 3/4 whenever this condition is met. One
optimal choice for Alice is for example |a| = |b| = 1/√2
and c = d = 0. In this case, ρ0 = |+〉 〈+| and ρ1 =
1/2(|0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1|). Alice should measure in the |+〉 , |−〉
basis, where |±〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2. With probability 1/4,
she will obtain the outcome “−”, and is then sure that
Bob obtained the second bit (outcomes (0,−) or (1,+) for
Bob). With probability 3/4, she will obtain the outcome
“+”, and then she guesses that Bob obtained the first
bit. Her guess is in this case however only correct with
probability 2/3, giving an overall cheating probability of
3/4.
Choosing either |a| or |c| equal to 1/√2 and the other
one equal to zero, and either |b| or |d| equal to 1/√2
and the other one equal to zero gives the same cheating
probability. These optimal cheating strategies all require
only a two-dimensional system on Alice’s side. Choosing
|a| = |b| = |c| = |d| = 1/2 also gives pcheat = 3/4; these
are examples of cheating states with high symmetry. As
an example of a suboptimal cheating strategy, choosing
three of the parameters equal to 1
√
3 and the remaining
one equal to zero gives pcheat = 1/2(1 +
√
2/3), which is
less than 3/4.
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Appendix C: Preparation of Alice’s entangled state
In this appendix we will in detail describe the prepa-
ration of the state (33),
|Σ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉B |0〉A + |+ +〉B |1〉A) .
This state can be prepared by means of a controlled-
phase gate UCP, a Hadamard gate H, a controlled-
controlled-phase gate UCCP, and local unitary opera-
tions. Controlled phase gates introduce tunable and con-
ditional phase shifts. Specifically,
UCP = I + [exp(iα)− 1]|11〉〈11|,
UCCP = UCCP = I + [exp(iβ)− 1]|111〉〈111|.
We used the quantum circuit in Fig. 1a to turn an initially
separable state |ψin〉 into a state which is equivalent to
|Σ〉 up to local unitary operations. The parameters α, β
describe the net operation U(α, β) = UCCP(β)(I ⊗ H ⊗
I)(UCP(α)⊗ I).
The input state can be parametrized by two tuples of
angles, θ = {θi=1,2,3} and φ = {φi=1,2,3}, as
|ψin〉 =
⊗∏
i=1,2,3
[
cos(θi/2)|0〉+ sin(θi/2)eiφi |1〉
]
.
The degree of local-unitary equivalence E(|a〉, |b〉) be-
tween states |a〉 and |b〉 can be quantified by an overlap
maximized over all local unitary operations
E(|a〉, |b〉) = max
v
|〈a|VLO(v)|b〉|2,
where v is a tuple containing 9 parameters
{Aj , Bj , Cj}j=1,2,3 which parametrize the operation
VLO = V1 ⊗ V2 ⊗ V3. Specifically, the parameters Aj , Bj ,
and Cj describe a j-th local operation
Vj =
(
cos(Aj) exp(iBj) − sin(Aj) exp(−iCj)
sin(Aj) exp(iCj) cos(Aj) exp(−iBj)
)
. (C1)
We maximized E(|Σ〉, U(α, β)|ψin(θ,φ)〉) numerically us-
ing the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) algo-
rithm [52].
First we performed the optimization with all pa-
rameters being free and with multiple random initial
guesses. From the set of optima we arbitrarily picked
the parameter-tuples with θ1 ≈ 120◦, fixed θ1 = 120◦
and performed the optimization again. We repeated this
procedure to gradually fix also φ1, θ2, φ2, β, and ϕ3, in
this order. The parameters α and θ3 remained free in the
last round of the optimization. The optimal parameters
are listed in Tab. I. With these parameters, the comple-
ment of E to one is sufficiently small, 1− E ≈ 8 · 10−11.
Next, we initialized the circuit and the input state with
the optimal parameters and performed tomography of
θ1 120.000
◦ φ1 22.500◦
θ2 90.000
◦ φ2 90.000◦
θ3 116.565
◦ φ3 180.000◦
α −138.190◦ β 180.000◦
TABLE I. Optimal parameters for preparation of state |Σ〉 .
the output quantum state. Employing the maximum-
likelihood method [50] we reconstructed the density ma-
trix ρexp,0 of actually prepared quantum state. Then we
numerically maximized the expectation value
〈Σ|ULO(u)ρexp,0U†LO(u)|Σ〉
to find the corrective local operations ULO. The opti-
mal ULO not only implements the required local opera-
tion to finish the preparation of |Σ〉, but also compen-
sates for some systematic errors. The parameters of the
optimal unitaries are listed in Tab. II. We parametrize
ULO = U1 ⊗ U2 ⊗ U3 the same way as in case of V , see
Eq. (C1). Note that these parameters are not unique,
multiple solutions exist (due to insensitivity to global
phase and phase periodicity).
i Ai [deg] Bi [deg] Ci [deg]
1 41.315 49.770 136.535
2 48.385 -37.718 42.637
3 29.367 -1.225 -177.329
TABLE II. Parameters of the corrective unitary operations.
An arbitrary unitary operation acting on a single po-
larization qubit can be easily implemented by a sequence
of a quarter-wave plate, half-wave plate, and another
quarter-wave plate. However, we merged the unitary
ULO into final projective measurements. It can be done
because the output state is projected at the end onto
a state |pi〉 and the projection 〈pi|Ui|η〉 is equivalent to
〈p˜i|η〉 with |p˜i〉 = U†i |pi〉. We found the corresponding
wave-plate angles for six-state tomography by means of
numerical minimization. They are listed in Tab. III. This
optimization reduces the number of components in the
experimental setup, reducing experimental imperfections
and losses which accumulate with each added component.
|pi〉 HWP1 QWP1 HWP2 QWP2 HWP3 QWP3
|0〉 -15.35 49.83 9.80 53.28 80.78 8.54
|1〉 29.65 -40.17 91.52 -53.28 27.24 -8.54
|+〉 3.16 94.65 47.90 92.29 9.80 92.26
|−〉 43.50 85.35 2.90 2.29 -35.20 2.26
|R〉 22.80 -1.28 64.96 82.06 9.51 53.85
|L〉 -20.93 1.28 19.96 -7.94 54.51 -36.15
TABLE III. Wave-plate angles for transformed projectors. All
numbers are in degrees.
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Appendix D: Experimental data
In this appendix we present the full sets of experimen-
tal data. The tables contain measured counts C, rela-
tive frequencies (or estimated probabilities) f , and theo-
retically predicted probabilities pt. Relative frequencies
were calculated as a ratio of the number of respective
counts to the total number of counts. Digits in paren-
thesis represent one standard deviation at the final dec-
imal place. The statistical errors were computed using
error-propagation and the fact that the count-rates obey
Poisson distribution.
Table IV shows data for the case when both parties
were honest. Alice sent states |00〉, |++〉, |−−〉, |11〉 and
Bob measured in the ZX basis. Table V shows data for
Bob’s test measurements when he measured the incoming
states in the XX or ZZ basis.
Table VI summarizes results for the situation when
Alice was honest but Bob was cheating. This means that
Bob has been performing square-root measurements.
The situation when Bob was honest but Alice was
cheating is recorded in the last two tables. Table VII
shows the relative frequencies of Alice’s correct and in-
correct estimates of the values of Bob’s bit c. Table VIII
shows relative frequencies of different results of Alice’s
and Bob’s measurements in the test phase of the pro-
tocol. Theoretically, Bob should only detect | + +〉 or
|00〉.
|ψB〉 |piB〉 ps
|0+〉 |0−〉 |1+〉 |1−〉
C |00〉 892 829 3 3
f 0.52(1) 0.48(1) 0.002(1) 0.002(1) 1.00(2)
pt 0.5 0.5 0 0 1
C |+ +〉 823 2 782 7
f 0.51(1) 0.0012(9) 0.48(1) 0.004(2) 0.99(2)
pt 0.5 0 0.5 0 1
C | − −〉 7 824 15 867
f 0.004(2) 0.48(1) 0.009(2) 0.51(1) 0.99(2)
pt 0 0.5 0 0.5 1
C |11〉 0 1 800 841
f 0.000(0) 0.0006(5) 0.49(1) 0.51(1) 1.00(2)
pt 0 0 0.5 0.5 1
TABLE IV. Measured counts C, relative frequencies f , and
corresponding theoretical probabilities pt for the situation
when both the parties were honest. |ψB〉 is a state which Al-
ice sends to Bob. Bob measures projection onto |piB〉. Here,
ps is the probability of correct receipt, i.e. Bob gets erroneous
bit with probability 1− ps.
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|ψB〉 |piB〉 pFA
|00〉 |01〉 |10〉 |11〉
C |00〉 1701 3 1 0
f 0.998(1) 0.002(1) 0.0006(5) 0.000(0) 0.002(1)
pt 1 0 0 0 0
C |11〉 0 0 15 1592
f 0.000(0) 0.000(0) 0.009(2) 0.991(2) 0.009(2)
pt 0 0 0 1 0
|+ +〉 |+−〉 | −+〉 | − −〉
C |+ +〉 1615 1 43 1
f 0.973(4) 0.0006(5) 0.026(4) 0.0006(5) 0.027(4)
pt 1 0 0 0 0
C | − −〉 5 9 9 1660
f 0.003(1) 0.005(2) 0.005(2) 0.986(3) 0.014(3)
pt 0 0 0 1 0
TABLE V. Data for Bob’s test measurements in the case when
Alice was honest. Here, pFA is the probability of “false alarm”,
i.e. the probability that Bob aborts the protocol even if Alice
is not cheating.
|ψB〉 |piB〉 pCE
|ζ0〉|ξ0〉 |ζ0〉|ξ1〉 |ζ1〉|ξ0〉 |ζ1〉|ξ1〉
C |00〉 85 1215 4 114
f 0.060(6) 0.857(9) 0.003(1) 0.080(7) 0.857(9)
pt 0.125 0.729 0.021 0.125 0.729
C |+ +〉 1013 184 301 53
f 0.65(1) 0.119(8) 0.19(1) 0.034(5) 0.65(1)
pt 0.729 0.125 0.125 0.021 0.729
C | − −〉 64 253 384 1441
f 0.030(4) 0.118(7) 0.179(8) 0.67(1) 0.67(1)
pt 0.021 0.125 0.125 0.729 0.729
C |11〉 228 48 1360 253
f 0.121(7) 0.025(4) 0.72(1) 0.134(8) 0.72(1)
pt 0.125 0.021 0.729 0.125 0.729
TABLE VI. Bob was cheating, Alice was honest. Here, pCE
is the probability of Bob correctly estimating the incoming
state.
Alice’s Bob’s
estimate bit c C f pt
0 0 856 0.53(1) 0.5
0 1 356 0.22(1) 0.25
1 0 17 0.010(3) 0
1 1 400 0.25(1) 0.25
TABLE VII. Alice was cheating, Bob was honest. The table
shows the probabilities of Alice correctly/incorrectly guessing
Bob’s bit c.
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|piA〉 |piB〉 C f pt
|0〉 |00〉 851 0.52(1) 0.5
|0〉 |01〉 15 0.009(2) 0
|0〉 |10〉 28 0.017(3) 0
|0〉 |11〉 31 0.019(3) 0
|1〉 |+ +〉 688 0.42(1) 0.5
|1〉 |+−〉 7 0.004(2) 0
|1〉 | −+〉 11 0.007(2) 0
|1〉 | − −〉 4 0.002(1) 0
TABLE VIII. Test measurements for an honest Bob when
Alice was cheating. Alice measured her qubit in the Z basis
and Bob measured his qubit in the ZZ or XX basis.
